Hey Folks. Sorry I haven't updated in a while. I've been busy. Some good news: I finally won in my struggle with the Italian bureaucracy. I will be starting the Master's in Cooperative Economics at the end of October. But before that, in September, I'll be acting as interpreter for a group of Indians coming to Bologna to study the Emilian Model of development.
Some other tidbits:
Check out Bush singing "Sunday Bloody Sunday." I found it on my brother Eric's blog.
Saw two good movies this summer while I was at home for a month: Fahrenheit 9/11, which I thought was brilliantly made and very convincing (make sure you bring undecided voters with you when you see it) and the Manchurian Candidate, another well made film that was quite twisted and disturbing, not to mention the great performances by the film's stars.
That's all for now. Will have something more substantial up soon.
Thursday, September 09, 2004
Thursday, July 29, 2004
Bureaucracy
What a horrible word. I even had to look it up in the dictionary because I new I wasn't spelling it right.
I know this blog is supposed to be explicitly political, but it's 4:30 in the morning and its the fault of the Italian bureaucracy that I'm not in bed now sleeping.
Italy is famous for it's layers and layers of bureaucracy. The thick bureaucracy and tons of legislation that go along with it are actually the products of attempts to protect citizens in the early days of the Italian Republic from the arbitrary authority of the state.
This protection has grown into an oppressive monster whose prey I have become.
In Italy there are three levels of bureaucracy: the central state bureaucracy, state agencies and para-state agencies. (Note: this last term has nothing to do with the term "para-military.") Many times these bureaucracies have overlapping jurisdictions; almost always they create needless hassle, paperwork and generally slow things down tremendously: whether it's applying for a visa or starting a new business, the bureaucracy is a drag.
My beef right now is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the the Ministry of Public Instruction. I think my case is indicative.
Last August (2003) I went to Bologna, Italy to study. I had originally planned on doing an undergraduate history degree (on the advice of a bureaucrat), but then found out from a professor that I was eligible to apply for a Master's Degree in Cooperative Economics.
Given that I wanted to study cooperative economics, and that I had already done four years of college as a history major and didn't really want to repeat my undergraduate degree, this seemed like the best option.
But all was not destined to run smoothly (is it ever when you have to deal with the Italian bureaucracy?).
We quickly ran into a problem. With the new university reform, was an American Bachelor's degree enough to get you into a Master? So to find out, the University called the Italian Consulate in the United States. The Consulate in Houston, Texas!
I would like to remind readers that the current President of the United States is from Texas, since 1982 they have executed 323 people, and, despite a recent Supreme Court ruling, refuse to ban the execution of the mentally retarded.
Couldn't they have picked another consulate to ask advice of?
Regardless, the consulate was absolutely sure: there was no way that my Bachelor's degree would allow me to do the Master's program.
So I went ahead and enrolled as a history student, paid the first half of the tuition and started about the process of getting my credits from school here transferred over there.
Then, about a month after I had paid tuition and it was too late to apply for the Master's, I called up the person who had contacted the Houston Consulate about the Master's program. "Oh, you, you're the American," she said. "I owe you an apology, I screwed you out of a year."
Huh?
So, yeah, it turns out the Houston, Texas consulate is not so reliable after all. Turns out that I could have, indeed, done the Master's program.
Funny how a Bachelor's degree will get you into a Master's program in the United States and in Italy.
I stayed calm, though. Took a few deep breaths and thought it through. "This isn't that bad, I've got the visa for a year, so why not hang out in Bologna and do the Master's next year?"
Turns out that was the best possible scenario. I got a great job as a "Junior Researcher" at the Institute for Labor in Bologna and got a chance to be a tour guide/interpreter for the wonderful Bologna Summer Program for Cooperative Studies.
By the time the school year came to an end, I decided to find out exactly what I had to do to apply for the Master's program. Any guesses as to the process? (Remember, at this point I'm still living in Bologna; interestingly enough not too far from the University of Bologna!)
Turns out that to apply for the Master's program I have to fly home, hand in the application at the Italian Consulate so that they can put it in an envelope and send it back to the University of Bologna.
Makes sense, right?
Well, the plane ticket only cost $1,200. Then there's the fact that I have to take a month off from work--even more, perhaps, if all doesn't go smoothly.
There being no other option I, of course, decided to play their little game.
I withdrew from the history program about a week ago, collected all the papers and documentation from the registrar that I needed to apply to the Master's and got on the plane to come back home.
Yesterday morning, Wednesday July 28, I woke up suddenly in a panic. I realized that I was missing some of the documentation necessary to apply for the Master's!
I quickly checked my accordion folder (aka "Nerd Pack") where I keep all this kind of stuff and, sure enough, the translation of the course descriptions and my college diploma were not there.
My level of panic increased slightly at this point. With all of the self-contained Jack Bauer rage I could muster, I thought, "Son of a bitch!" Then I realized there was nothing I could do at that moment, because Italy is six hours ahead of New York and all the offices were closed. A phone call to the registrar would have to wait until 2 AM New York time.
I finally got through to the registrar's office around 3:00 AM my time. They asked me to send a fax requesting the missing documents. After having sent the fax, I called my heroic friend, co-worker and housemate, Davide Dazzi, and asked if he would be willing to go pick up the documents and FedEx them to my house. With his help, and a little luck, things just might work out.
It's now 6:43 AM, I'm really starting to go batty, but I think we might be close to mission accomplished. They're just finishing sending over the faxes. I think the story wil have a happy ending.
Nonetheless, this was all 100% avoidable.
I have a few concrete suggestions for action: (1) to simply create a procedure for foreign students, living in Italy who are currently attending university in Italy who want to change from one program to another, that allows them to apply directly to the University, in person. This procedure already exists for folks working in Italy who also want to study; (2) now this second suggestion is a little bit more radical: each agency should have one person, or a team of people, whose job it is, in close consultation with the principle stakeholders (citizens and civil servants) to figure out the simplest, most efficient way of doing something.
Of course, my encounters with the bureaucracy are small compared to what many others have had to endure. When citizens, small businesses (and the Right) complain about the oppressive nature of the Italian state, they are not wrong. This is an issue the Left needs to aggressively address and co-opt from the Right by proposing a radical, progressive vision for bureaucratic reform.
Okay, so, maybe this was explicitly political.
I know this blog is supposed to be explicitly political, but it's 4:30 in the morning and its the fault of the Italian bureaucracy that I'm not in bed now sleeping.
Italy is famous for it's layers and layers of bureaucracy. The thick bureaucracy and tons of legislation that go along with it are actually the products of attempts to protect citizens in the early days of the Italian Republic from the arbitrary authority of the state.
This protection has grown into an oppressive monster whose prey I have become.
In Italy there are three levels of bureaucracy: the central state bureaucracy, state agencies and para-state agencies. (Note: this last term has nothing to do with the term "para-military.") Many times these bureaucracies have overlapping jurisdictions; almost always they create needless hassle, paperwork and generally slow things down tremendously: whether it's applying for a visa or starting a new business, the bureaucracy is a drag.
My beef right now is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the the Ministry of Public Instruction. I think my case is indicative.
Last August (2003) I went to Bologna, Italy to study. I had originally planned on doing an undergraduate history degree (on the advice of a bureaucrat), but then found out from a professor that I was eligible to apply for a Master's Degree in Cooperative Economics.
Given that I wanted to study cooperative economics, and that I had already done four years of college as a history major and didn't really want to repeat my undergraduate degree, this seemed like the best option.
But all was not destined to run smoothly (is it ever when you have to deal with the Italian bureaucracy?).
We quickly ran into a problem. With the new university reform, was an American Bachelor's degree enough to get you into a Master? So to find out, the University called the Italian Consulate in the United States. The Consulate in Houston, Texas!
I would like to remind readers that the current President of the United States is from Texas, since 1982 they have executed 323 people, and, despite a recent Supreme Court ruling, refuse to ban the execution of the mentally retarded.
Couldn't they have picked another consulate to ask advice of?
Regardless, the consulate was absolutely sure: there was no way that my Bachelor's degree would allow me to do the Master's program.
So I went ahead and enrolled as a history student, paid the first half of the tuition and started about the process of getting my credits from school here transferred over there.
Then, about a month after I had paid tuition and it was too late to apply for the Master's, I called up the person who had contacted the Houston Consulate about the Master's program. "Oh, you, you're the American," she said. "I owe you an apology, I screwed you out of a year."
Huh?
So, yeah, it turns out the Houston, Texas consulate is not so reliable after all. Turns out that I could have, indeed, done the Master's program.
Funny how a Bachelor's degree will get you into a Master's program in the United States and in Italy.
I stayed calm, though. Took a few deep breaths and thought it through. "This isn't that bad, I've got the visa for a year, so why not hang out in Bologna and do the Master's next year?"
Turns out that was the best possible scenario. I got a great job as a "Junior Researcher" at the Institute for Labor in Bologna and got a chance to be a tour guide/interpreter for the wonderful Bologna Summer Program for Cooperative Studies.
By the time the school year came to an end, I decided to find out exactly what I had to do to apply for the Master's program. Any guesses as to the process? (Remember, at this point I'm still living in Bologna; interestingly enough not too far from the University of Bologna!)
Turns out that to apply for the Master's program I have to fly home, hand in the application at the Italian Consulate so that they can put it in an envelope and send it back to the University of Bologna.
Makes sense, right?
Well, the plane ticket only cost $1,200. Then there's the fact that I have to take a month off from work--even more, perhaps, if all doesn't go smoothly.
There being no other option I, of course, decided to play their little game.
I withdrew from the history program about a week ago, collected all the papers and documentation from the registrar that I needed to apply to the Master's and got on the plane to come back home.
Yesterday morning, Wednesday July 28, I woke up suddenly in a panic. I realized that I was missing some of the documentation necessary to apply for the Master's!
I quickly checked my accordion folder (aka "Nerd Pack") where I keep all this kind of stuff and, sure enough, the translation of the course descriptions and my college diploma were not there.
My level of panic increased slightly at this point. With all of the self-contained Jack Bauer rage I could muster, I thought, "Son of a bitch!" Then I realized there was nothing I could do at that moment, because Italy is six hours ahead of New York and all the offices were closed. A phone call to the registrar would have to wait until 2 AM New York time.
I finally got through to the registrar's office around 3:00 AM my time. They asked me to send a fax requesting the missing documents. After having sent the fax, I called my heroic friend, co-worker and housemate, Davide Dazzi, and asked if he would be willing to go pick up the documents and FedEx them to my house. With his help, and a little luck, things just might work out.
It's now 6:43 AM, I'm really starting to go batty, but I think we might be close to mission accomplished. They're just finishing sending over the faxes. I think the story wil have a happy ending.
Nonetheless, this was all 100% avoidable.
I have a few concrete suggestions for action: (1) to simply create a procedure for foreign students, living in Italy who are currently attending university in Italy who want to change from one program to another, that allows them to apply directly to the University, in person. This procedure already exists for folks working in Italy who also want to study; (2) now this second suggestion is a little bit more radical: each agency should have one person, or a team of people, whose job it is, in close consultation with the principle stakeholders (citizens and civil servants) to figure out the simplest, most efficient way of doing something.
Of course, my encounters with the bureaucracy are small compared to what many others have had to endure. When citizens, small businesses (and the Right) complain about the oppressive nature of the Italian state, they are not wrong. This is an issue the Left needs to aggressively address and co-opt from the Right by proposing a radical, progressive vision for bureaucratic reform.
Okay, so, maybe this was explicitly political.
Monday, July 19, 2004
A Few Words on the Green Party's Presidential Nominating Convention
The Green Party took a significant step forward with its nomination of David Cobb and Pat LaMarche as Presidential and Vice-presidential candidates.
Cobb's "safe states" strategy aims the main blow against Bush and the neo-cons, and not the "two-party system" in general. This means that Greens can help beat Bush, maintain their independence (and their differences with the DLC Democrats), while defending their ballot access and perhaps growing modestly.
Most importantly, Greens rejected pressure to run an all-out, opposition to the "establishment parties" campaign. Even if such a strategy didn't hand the election to Bush, it would have only marginalized Greens among progressives and the electorate in general.
For more detailed coverage and analysis of the Green Party's convention and election 2004, see Carl Davidson's commentary.
Cobb's "safe states" strategy aims the main blow against Bush and the neo-cons, and not the "two-party system" in general. This means that Greens can help beat Bush, maintain their independence (and their differences with the DLC Democrats), while defending their ballot access and perhaps growing modestly.
Most importantly, Greens rejected pressure to run an all-out, opposition to the "establishment parties" campaign. Even if such a strategy didn't hand the election to Bush, it would have only marginalized Greens among progressives and the electorate in general.
For more detailed coverage and analysis of the Green Party's convention and election 2004, see Carl Davidson's commentary.
Friday, June 18, 2004
Miopia Latina
For those of you who read Italian, here's a link to an article that I wrote with Davide Dazzi, a colleague of mine, regarding High Road forms of work organization. The article appeared in the weekly newspaper of Italy's largest labor union, CGIL.
To read the article, just click here.
... Matt
To read the article, just click here.
... Matt
Thursday, June 17, 2004
The High Road to Sustainable Development
The High Road to Sustainable Development
Markets as a Tool for Change
By Matt Hancock
Markets are a dirty word for many on the Left. Markets are equated with capitalism, “free market” or neo-liberal ideology, and exploitation. Yes, markets can be mechanisms of exploitation, and are currently shaped by the values of a capitalist economy, but they do not equal exploitation and capitalism. In fact, markets have been around for 10,000 years—long before capitalism. Markets were a part of the feudal system, just as they are a part of capitalist and socialist systems. Under any system, they can be a tool for democracy and development; or exploitation and de-development. It depends on who is calling the shots.
In his February 2003 article in In These Times, “Playing the Market,” G. William Domhoff called on the Left to build a cross-class “egalitarian movement” that makes “planning through the market” its central strategy. The Left should abandon ideas of central planning, embrace the market as a tool for change, and use the power of the state to build a more equitable economy.
But in the age of globalized capital, a successful movement must also address the fundamental issue of who's producing wealth. To build a really sustainable economy, labor and communities need to actually contend in the market, to start taking responsibility for producing wealth. A successful egalitarian movement must also use the power of the state to make labor and community the driving force in wealth production.
---------
Social and labor movements in the United States have almost always focused their demands on issues of wealth distribution, while ceding to the private sector the undisputed right to make decisions about management, about wealth production. Whether the struggle was militant or conservative in nature, the demands always focused on distribution of wealth: a pay raise, better health benefits, fewer working hours, better pension plans etc.
This was the basis of the social contract: labor would negotiate a greater share of the wealth it produced, while agreeing to stay out of management. To a great extent, this worked. With an expanding economy the wealth was there and the corporate leaders were willing to share it, within limits. There was a good deal of truth to the expression, “what's good for General Motors is good for the country.”
---------
The advent of the microchip and the end of the Bretton Woods agreement unleashed capital from its national chains. Some managers learned quickly that they could make substantial returns in speculation and other short-term investment strategies. This gave way to the Low Road business strategy: rather than making a product, managers began gambling with a company's assets or moving production abroad. Management let profitable factories slowly die, while pushing labor as far as they could for give-backs, and then opened up shop in foreign countries to exploit cheap labor.
These strategies were not required by the market in order for the companies to survive. Managers could have continued to aim for long-term profits by boosting productivity and increasing standard of living. Instead they chose to maximize short-term shareholder returns by deliberately destroying productive capacity. They became the equivalent of slum lords in the housing market—making a big return with strategies that destroy the assets over time.
---------
These dramatic changes in the global economy, and the ruling class' abandonment of its role as “steward of the economy,” require a major shift in strategy for the Left. First, those pursuing a Low Road, speculative strategy must be blocked and prevented from continuing their destructive practices. Second, labor and communities must take full responsibility for driving the creation of wealth. We must pursue a High Road strategy that creates businesses that make a return in ways that build the company and increase society’s productive capacity, promote a healthy environment, fair treatment of workers, and build strong communities. Labor and community, through their own initiatives including alliances with High Road business leaders, need to seek greater control of the firm and the economy at both the micro and macro level.
----------
The success of this strategy depends on creating a cross-class, mass movement that can muster the political will to build a High Road economy. Labor and community need a political movement that can help them block the Low Road, encourage High Road development and leverage the creation of worker and community-owned business.
To this end, planning through the market is essential. Taxes, incentives, regulation and government procurement are the tools with which to effectively and justly organize the economy. The state should favor High Road businesses that pursue a policy of financial transparency, allow employees to organize unions, seek to make a profit by building productive capacity and contribute to making communities healthy and sustainable.
An effective movement must also use its muscle to give labor and communities the tools it needs to successfully contend in the market.
To start with we need to strengthen the existing tools that labor and communities have, like the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) legislation. The ESOP legislation provides tax incentives to companies that give employees a percentage of stock in the company. Unfortunately, the legislation is filled with holes and does not require the company to actually give its employees any say in managing the company. The ESOP legislation should be changed to make it a genuine tool for increased worker-participation and ownership.
Currently, Low Road companies receive billions of dollars each year from local, state and federal governments through tax breaks and incentives, including funds to help American companies move production out of the country. An egalitarian movement should end these Low Road practices and use economic development subsidies to invest in High Road and worker-owned enterprises. Imagine if the billions spent each year on corporate welfare were used to help labor and community organizations buy out companies from Low Road management and start their own enterprises from scratch, revitalizing inner-city economies and breathing new life into our communities.
We can also learn much from the international experience. For example, in a number of countries, like Canada, labor-based mutual-benefit-funds have been set up to provide venture capital for cooperative startups and employee buyouts. These private investment funds can be started with seed money from the local, state or national government, union pension funds and private investors. Individuals can be encouraged to contribute to these funds through tax rebates or incentives.
Italy and Spain also provide some great examples. In Northern Italy, regional governments, under the leadership of the Italian Communist Party for 30 years, provided direct assistance to the infrastructure that supported local manufacturing companies and clusters. As a result, the Emilia Romagna region, for example, went from one of the poorest regions in Europe after World War II to one of the wealthiest.
In Spain a small manufacturing coop was created in the 1950s by 5 workers and a local priest. There was a ceiling and floor to wages and decisions were made on the basis of one worker, one vote. They expanded and today over 65,000 people work in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation complex and represent the leading edge of the Spanish industrial and retail economy. Eroski—a coopertive retail store—defeated Walmart from entering the Spanish economy.
Eminent domain is another powerful tool that government can use to build the High Road economy. Why shouldn't a city use the power of eminent domain to prevent Low Road managers from destroying a community's productive capacity? Imagine if, during the 1980s, the government had used eminent domain to keep profitable factories open by buying them, at fair market value, from their Low Road owners or shareholders and then turning them into community or worker-owned businesses. What better use of eminent domain than to save the life of a community?
Finally, a successful egalitarian movement must be able to train future High Road business leaders. Too often public universities are training the next generation of Low Road managers. Management schools that receive public money must train people to build and run businesses that strengthen society's productive capacity, increase the standard of living and build strong communities. There should be no place for the Low Road at a public university or management schools that receive public money. We need a student movement that isn’t anti-corporate but is focused on forcing business schools funded by public monies to become centers for High Road business practices and intellectual work, not troughs for the Low Roaders to continue to feed at the public expense.
-----------------
To be sure, this is a bold strategy. But if we're serious about building a better society, we need to be bold. We need to re-evaluate everything, get rid of outdated strategies, and keep what works. One of the most significant first-steps we can take is to rethink our ideas about the market. We need to lose our knee-jerk rejection of the market and build a courageous, new strategy that sees the market as the terrain on which, in addition to the state, we contend for our vision of a better society.
The Center for Labor and Community Research has been a champion for these kinds of approaches and has a longer strategy paper—Building the Bridge to the High Road—on its web site: www.clcr.org
Markets as a Tool for Change
By Matt Hancock
Markets are a dirty word for many on the Left. Markets are equated with capitalism, “free market” or neo-liberal ideology, and exploitation. Yes, markets can be mechanisms of exploitation, and are currently shaped by the values of a capitalist economy, but they do not equal exploitation and capitalism. In fact, markets have been around for 10,000 years—long before capitalism. Markets were a part of the feudal system, just as they are a part of capitalist and socialist systems. Under any system, they can be a tool for democracy and development; or exploitation and de-development. It depends on who is calling the shots.
In his February 2003 article in In These Times, “Playing the Market,” G. William Domhoff called on the Left to build a cross-class “egalitarian movement” that makes “planning through the market” its central strategy. The Left should abandon ideas of central planning, embrace the market as a tool for change, and use the power of the state to build a more equitable economy.
But in the age of globalized capital, a successful movement must also address the fundamental issue of who's producing wealth. To build a really sustainable economy, labor and communities need to actually contend in the market, to start taking responsibility for producing wealth. A successful egalitarian movement must also use the power of the state to make labor and community the driving force in wealth production.
---------
Social and labor movements in the United States have almost always focused their demands on issues of wealth distribution, while ceding to the private sector the undisputed right to make decisions about management, about wealth production. Whether the struggle was militant or conservative in nature, the demands always focused on distribution of wealth: a pay raise, better health benefits, fewer working hours, better pension plans etc.
This was the basis of the social contract: labor would negotiate a greater share of the wealth it produced, while agreeing to stay out of management. To a great extent, this worked. With an expanding economy the wealth was there and the corporate leaders were willing to share it, within limits. There was a good deal of truth to the expression, “what's good for General Motors is good for the country.”
---------
The advent of the microchip and the end of the Bretton Woods agreement unleashed capital from its national chains. Some managers learned quickly that they could make substantial returns in speculation and other short-term investment strategies. This gave way to the Low Road business strategy: rather than making a product, managers began gambling with a company's assets or moving production abroad. Management let profitable factories slowly die, while pushing labor as far as they could for give-backs, and then opened up shop in foreign countries to exploit cheap labor.
These strategies were not required by the market in order for the companies to survive. Managers could have continued to aim for long-term profits by boosting productivity and increasing standard of living. Instead they chose to maximize short-term shareholder returns by deliberately destroying productive capacity. They became the equivalent of slum lords in the housing market—making a big return with strategies that destroy the assets over time.
---------
These dramatic changes in the global economy, and the ruling class' abandonment of its role as “steward of the economy,” require a major shift in strategy for the Left. First, those pursuing a Low Road, speculative strategy must be blocked and prevented from continuing their destructive practices. Second, labor and communities must take full responsibility for driving the creation of wealth. We must pursue a High Road strategy that creates businesses that make a return in ways that build the company and increase society’s productive capacity, promote a healthy environment, fair treatment of workers, and build strong communities. Labor and community, through their own initiatives including alliances with High Road business leaders, need to seek greater control of the firm and the economy at both the micro and macro level.
----------
The success of this strategy depends on creating a cross-class, mass movement that can muster the political will to build a High Road economy. Labor and community need a political movement that can help them block the Low Road, encourage High Road development and leverage the creation of worker and community-owned business.
To this end, planning through the market is essential. Taxes, incentives, regulation and government procurement are the tools with which to effectively and justly organize the economy. The state should favor High Road businesses that pursue a policy of financial transparency, allow employees to organize unions, seek to make a profit by building productive capacity and contribute to making communities healthy and sustainable.
An effective movement must also use its muscle to give labor and communities the tools it needs to successfully contend in the market.
To start with we need to strengthen the existing tools that labor and communities have, like the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) legislation. The ESOP legislation provides tax incentives to companies that give employees a percentage of stock in the company. Unfortunately, the legislation is filled with holes and does not require the company to actually give its employees any say in managing the company. The ESOP legislation should be changed to make it a genuine tool for increased worker-participation and ownership.
Currently, Low Road companies receive billions of dollars each year from local, state and federal governments through tax breaks and incentives, including funds to help American companies move production out of the country. An egalitarian movement should end these Low Road practices and use economic development subsidies to invest in High Road and worker-owned enterprises. Imagine if the billions spent each year on corporate welfare were used to help labor and community organizations buy out companies from Low Road management and start their own enterprises from scratch, revitalizing inner-city economies and breathing new life into our communities.
We can also learn much from the international experience. For example, in a number of countries, like Canada, labor-based mutual-benefit-funds have been set up to provide venture capital for cooperative startups and employee buyouts. These private investment funds can be started with seed money from the local, state or national government, union pension funds and private investors. Individuals can be encouraged to contribute to these funds through tax rebates or incentives.
Italy and Spain also provide some great examples. In Northern Italy, regional governments, under the leadership of the Italian Communist Party for 30 years, provided direct assistance to the infrastructure that supported local manufacturing companies and clusters. As a result, the Emilia Romagna region, for example, went from one of the poorest regions in Europe after World War II to one of the wealthiest.
In Spain a small manufacturing coop was created in the 1950s by 5 workers and a local priest. There was a ceiling and floor to wages and decisions were made on the basis of one worker, one vote. They expanded and today over 65,000 people work in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation complex and represent the leading edge of the Spanish industrial and retail economy. Eroski—a coopertive retail store—defeated Walmart from entering the Spanish economy.
Eminent domain is another powerful tool that government can use to build the High Road economy. Why shouldn't a city use the power of eminent domain to prevent Low Road managers from destroying a community's productive capacity? Imagine if, during the 1980s, the government had used eminent domain to keep profitable factories open by buying them, at fair market value, from their Low Road owners or shareholders and then turning them into community or worker-owned businesses. What better use of eminent domain than to save the life of a community?
Finally, a successful egalitarian movement must be able to train future High Road business leaders. Too often public universities are training the next generation of Low Road managers. Management schools that receive public money must train people to build and run businesses that strengthen society's productive capacity, increase the standard of living and build strong communities. There should be no place for the Low Road at a public university or management schools that receive public money. We need a student movement that isn’t anti-corporate but is focused on forcing business schools funded by public monies to become centers for High Road business practices and intellectual work, not troughs for the Low Roaders to continue to feed at the public expense.
-----------------
To be sure, this is a bold strategy. But if we're serious about building a better society, we need to be bold. We need to re-evaluate everything, get rid of outdated strategies, and keep what works. One of the most significant first-steps we can take is to rethink our ideas about the market. We need to lose our knee-jerk rejection of the market and build a courageous, new strategy that sees the market as the terrain on which, in addition to the state, we contend for our vision of a better society.
The Center for Labor and Community Research has been a champion for these kinds of approaches and has a longer strategy paper—Building the Bridge to the High Road—on its web site: www.clcr.org
The Green Party, Election 2004 and the Struggle for Peace and Justice
Note: This is a shorter, article-length version of my Green 2004 strategy paper
The Green Party, Election 2004 and the Struggle for Peace and Justice
By Matt Hancock
The most important debate at the Green Party’s upcoming Presidential Nominating Convention will not be over who to nominate or endorse as the Party’s presidential candidate, but over what kind of strategy Greens will pursue in the 2004 elections.
Right now the main, immediate threat to peace and democracy is George Bush and his neocon cabal. They are the principle architects of the war on Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home. If not defeated, the Bush neocons will further erode civil liberties and move to control the rest of the world. For these reasons, a Bush defeat in 2004 is a strategic objective for Greens.
Because of the enormous structural barriers to challenges by insurgent parties and the unbelievable amount of money needed to beat Bush-he’s raised more than $200 million to date-the candidate that beats him must have the support of a part of the US ruling class.
Bush has the backing of the reactionary Hegemonist ruling class faction. On the other side are the more multilateral-oriented Globalists-typified by investors like multi-billionaire George Soros-who are deeply disturbed by Bush’s neoconservative war policy. This is the faction that has the financial resources needed to beat Bush. This is the faction backing Kerry.
So where does this leave the Green Party? A Bush win is a defeat for Greens. He is the main threat to world peace and democratic rights at home. But co-optation by the Democrats is also a threat. Historically the Democrats have provided a safety valve for US elites, protecting the ruling class from popular movements by swallowing them up and letting them blow-off steam inside the Party.
It would be a mistake, then, for the Greens to endorse Kerry; if he wins in November, we still get imperialism. Key is adopting a strategy that makes “regime change at home” the primary objective, while building a progressive force capable of holding whoever wins accountable.
A good model for Greens to follow would be the anti-Bush, Peace and Justice Voters strategy promoted by the independent Chicagoans Against War in Iraq.
Peace and Justice Voters aim at building a broad-based, independent, progressive force beholden to no one but itself. The main thrust of Peace and Justice Voters is “regime change at home.” At the same time they know they’re part of a long-term struggle for peace and justice, and will have to hold Kerry accountable as well. The point is that beating Bush will make both easier.
How can this strategy be adapted by the Green Party? First, the Green Party and its candidate must make Bush’s hegemonism, and not the two party duopoly, the main target of their attacks. The choice in 2004 is not between “rule of the people” and “rule of the corporations,” but between two factions of the ruling class. This is the harsh reality.
The Green candidate should also try to “steal” votes from Bush, rather than convincing likely Democratic voters to go Green. The conservative Reform Party’s endorsement of Nader confirms that this is possible.
Most important, though, is expanding the electorate in a progressive way. Democrats and Republicans struggle to appeal to the ever shrinking group of “likely voters.” Greens, instead, must bring new, underrepresented people like students, people of color and poor people to the polls. This is where the margin for Bush’s defeat will come from. This is where a politics of transformation begins.
With no clear winner yet among delegates-Texas-native David Cobb has the single largest bloc of votes, but the Camejo, Nader, none-of-the-above and uncommitted delegates greatly outnumber him-the upcoming Green Party convention will be a difficult and contentious project. That’s democracy.
If, during the convention, the Greens choose a strategy similar to Peace and Justice Voters, they will be able to deal with the most immediate threat to peace and democracy without making-believe that Kerry represents a progressive alternative. Greens will have increased the anti-Bush turnout, perhaps even providing the margin for his defeat. But most important, the Green Party and society’s progressive forces will be in a better position to hold whoever wins accountable, and to build an alternative to two-party rule.
The Green Party, Election 2004 and the Struggle for Peace and Justice
By Matt Hancock
The most important debate at the Green Party’s upcoming Presidential Nominating Convention will not be over who to nominate or endorse as the Party’s presidential candidate, but over what kind of strategy Greens will pursue in the 2004 elections.
Right now the main, immediate threat to peace and democracy is George Bush and his neocon cabal. They are the principle architects of the war on Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home. If not defeated, the Bush neocons will further erode civil liberties and move to control the rest of the world. For these reasons, a Bush defeat in 2004 is a strategic objective for Greens.
Because of the enormous structural barriers to challenges by insurgent parties and the unbelievable amount of money needed to beat Bush-he’s raised more than $200 million to date-the candidate that beats him must have the support of a part of the US ruling class.
Bush has the backing of the reactionary Hegemonist ruling class faction. On the other side are the more multilateral-oriented Globalists-typified by investors like multi-billionaire George Soros-who are deeply disturbed by Bush’s neoconservative war policy. This is the faction that has the financial resources needed to beat Bush. This is the faction backing Kerry.
So where does this leave the Green Party? A Bush win is a defeat for Greens. He is the main threat to world peace and democratic rights at home. But co-optation by the Democrats is also a threat. Historically the Democrats have provided a safety valve for US elites, protecting the ruling class from popular movements by swallowing them up and letting them blow-off steam inside the Party.
It would be a mistake, then, for the Greens to endorse Kerry; if he wins in November, we still get imperialism. Key is adopting a strategy that makes “regime change at home” the primary objective, while building a progressive force capable of holding whoever wins accountable.
A good model for Greens to follow would be the anti-Bush, Peace and Justice Voters strategy promoted by the independent Chicagoans Against War in Iraq.
Peace and Justice Voters aim at building a broad-based, independent, progressive force beholden to no one but itself. The main thrust of Peace and Justice Voters is “regime change at home.” At the same time they know they’re part of a long-term struggle for peace and justice, and will have to hold Kerry accountable as well. The point is that beating Bush will make both easier.
How can this strategy be adapted by the Green Party? First, the Green Party and its candidate must make Bush’s hegemonism, and not the two party duopoly, the main target of their attacks. The choice in 2004 is not between “rule of the people” and “rule of the corporations,” but between two factions of the ruling class. This is the harsh reality.
The Green candidate should also try to “steal” votes from Bush, rather than convincing likely Democratic voters to go Green. The conservative Reform Party’s endorsement of Nader confirms that this is possible.
Most important, though, is expanding the electorate in a progressive way. Democrats and Republicans struggle to appeal to the ever shrinking group of “likely voters.” Greens, instead, must bring new, underrepresented people like students, people of color and poor people to the polls. This is where the margin for Bush’s defeat will come from. This is where a politics of transformation begins.
With no clear winner yet among delegates-Texas-native David Cobb has the single largest bloc of votes, but the Camejo, Nader, none-of-the-above and uncommitted delegates greatly outnumber him-the upcoming Green Party convention will be a difficult and contentious project. That’s democracy.
If, during the convention, the Greens choose a strategy similar to Peace and Justice Voters, they will be able to deal with the most immediate threat to peace and democracy without making-believe that Kerry represents a progressive alternative. Greens will have increased the anti-Bush turnout, perhaps even providing the margin for his defeat. But most important, the Green Party and society’s progressive forces will be in a better position to hold whoever wins accountable, and to build an alternative to two-party rule.
The Green Party & the 2004 Elections: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
The Green Party & the 2004 Elections: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
by Matt Hancock
6/16/04
The most important debate at the Green Party’s upcoming Presidential Nominating Convention will not be over who to nominate or endorse as the Party’s presidential candidate, but over what kind of strategy to pursue in the 2004 elections.
Right now the main, immediate threat to peace and democracy is George Bush and his neocon cabal. They are the principle architects of the war on Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home. If not defeated, the Bush neocons will further erode civil liberties and move to control the rest of the world. For these reasons, a Bush defeat in 2004 is a strategic objective for Greens.
The challenge for Greens is figuring out an approach to the 2004 elections that allows them to contribute to Bush's defeat, while continuing to build an independent party capable of challenging both the Democrats and the Republicans. Doing both is not as impossible as it seems. This paper aims to outline a strategy that will allow the Green Party to contribute to Bush's defeat, while sticking to its principles, continuing to grow, and build a long-term challenge to the two-party duopoly.
Between Two Dead-Ends
It often seems that the Green Party is stuck between two dead-end strategies: on one the hand you have the ultra-left oppositionists; and on the other are those Green Party critics who argue for a “lesser-of-two-evils” vote.
The ultra-left, opposition to “the establishment parties” in general strategy is perhaps best articulated by Peter Camejo's “The Avocado Declaration” and Ben Manski's, “Green and Growing: 2004 in Perspective.” Camejo does a good job of describing the historical development of the two party system and the important role the Democrats play in protecting the ruling class from popular movements. But he takes an often times ridiculously ultra-left position, even berating one of the Greens' strongest strategic allies within the Democratic Party, Dennis Kucinich. And while Camejo is correct that both Democrats and Republicans represent ruling class interests, he fails to grasp the important differences among members of the ruling class, and the historically specific factors the Left is faced with in 2004 (not to mention the Left's, and the Green party's, own weakness and marginality). Besides a good critique of the US political system, Camejo does not offer a viable strategy for the Green Party.
Manski, on the other hand, sees the 2004 presidential race as a “vital,” all-important test of the Green Party's ability to move from “alternative” to “opposition” party. Having established themselves as the “nation's opposition party” it would be a failure of “duty” if the Greens didn't “hold our own” in the 2004 presidential elections. One of the big problems with the paper is Manski's inflated view of the Green Party's strengths (not to mention the fact that most Americans don't see the Greens as the nation's opposition party). But most significantly, “Green and Growing” treats the presidential election (a once-every-four-years, publicity-driven horse race) as an all important party-building strategy, ignoring the overwhelming importance of local, non-partisan elections (as well as the importance of high-profile, local races like Matt Gonzalez's bid for Mayor in San Francisco, in which Bill Clinton had to intervene to guarantee a Democratic victory). What “Green and Growing” offers, opposition to the establishment on all fronts, simply isn't a strategy for building a party.
Looking at the importance that “Green and Growing” places on running a presidential candidate, one would expect to see significantly lower levels of Green Party growth in between presidential elections. This just isn't true. In the three years after Nader's run (2001-2003) the Greens elected a total of 204 candidates; that's an average of 68 per year. In 2000, with Nader's high-profile campaign, only 48 Greens won office. (In the four years before Nader2000, the total number of Greens elected was only 80). The great majority of these wins have been in local, non-partisan races. This is where most of the growth in the future will be.
This is not to say that Nader wasn't important for the Green Party. But more important was the move to create the national party (already underway when Nader made his run), to open up an office in DC, and the critical work done on the ground since the 2000 elections. Of course, none of this would have been possibile—including Nader2000—if the Greens hadn't laid the groundwork during the previous 15 years.
In short, the Green Party's success is not dependent on high-profile electoral politics, and will not, simply by not running someone in 2004, wither away.
So where does this leave us? Is 2004 simply “not the right time” for a third party challenge to the duopoly? Do Greens need to follow a lesser-of-two-evils strategy and support a mediocre candidate like Kerry who doesn't represent a fraction of the Greens' values and platform?
The short answer is no. The lesser-of-two-evils argument is short-sighted, intellectually weak and just plain depressing. This is a political dead-end. Not only does it guarantee that we keep getting evil, but it falls into the same trap as the ultra-left strategies: it offers no viable strategy for a transformational politics.
The Green Party must develop a new strategy that rejects both extremes, capable of dealing with the immediate problem of the Bush War Party and the long-term one of building a third party. But before getting into what such a strategy would look like, let's take a look at the political terrain progressives are faced with in 2004.
Is There Really a Difference Between Kerry and Bush?
Greens argue, correctly, that the two parties are both captives of “corporate interests” (read: the ruling class). But just as there are differences within the ruling class, there are also differences between the two parties. For this reason, Greens cannot afford to be indifferent to the outcome of the 2004 elections.
Bush is guided by the Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney-Perle “War Party.” The Bush War Party represents the most reactionary section of the ruling class—the Hegemonists—whose goal is nothing short of total American hegemony over the rest of the world. This is the group that opportunistically seized on September 11th to launch the war in Iraq and has been leading the assault on civil liberties at home. The Bush War Party is the main, immediate danger to peace abroad and democracy at home.
Bush has already out-fundraised Kerry nearly 2:1, leaving him with a more than $200 million war chest, against Kerry's $110 million. The nature of the highly media-driven US elections, the structural barriers to third party challenges and the overall weakness of the progressive forces means that beating Bush is going to require significant financial muscle. Right now only the ruling class has the material resources needed to beat Bush. This is why the upcoming presidential election cannot be seen as a struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism, but between two factions of the ruling class.
This is where the other main faction—the Globalists—comes in. The more multi-lateral oriented Globalists, typified by investors like George Soros, are dismayed by the Bush War Party. This is the faction that supports John Kerry's candidacy and that has the financial resources to beat Bush. (Soros, for example, has pledged a minimum of $12.5 million to beat Bush. ) Again, in 2004 the choice is not between Bush and an anti-imperialist, but between Hegemonists and Globalists.
Regime Change Begins at Home!
As Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz put it, in “Moving From Protest to Politics: Dumping Bush's Regime in 2004,” a Bush re-election will, “not only deepen the misery of those who suffer in this nation, but narrow the opportunity for dissent as well.” On the other hand, they point out, not only will the Bush War Party's Globalist rivals benefit from its defeat, all the progressive forces will benefit as well.
But beating Bush does not mean endorsing Kerry or supporting the Democrats (why endorse a candidate that doesn't even represent a fraction of your values?). What it does require is a shift in strategic thinking for the Green Party. Ralph Nader is right, DC is “corporate occupied territory” and we need to shift power to the American people; the Green Party is right, we need to break the grip of the two-party duopoly and build an effective third party. But running a presidential candidate is not the only (or even most effective) strategy for doing so.
First, we've seen that the growth of the Green Party is not dependent on a high-profile, national campaign, challenging the establishment parties on any and all fronts. Second it is in the overwhelming interests of the majority of people in the world, not to mention the development of the progressive forces (and the Green Party), to remove Bush from office. This is why dumping Bush is a strategic goal for the Green Party. This means that the Greens must make “Regime Change at Home” their battle-cry for the 2004 elections.
Green Strategy in 2004
A campaign for regime change means focusing the Green Party's main attacks against Bush, while working to bring a progressive bloc of anti-Bush voters to the polls. These voters will understand that Bush is the main threat to peace and democracy, but will not have any illusions about Kerry. They will be part of a growing independent progressive movement that will hold whoever wins accountable. Some of those anti-Bush voters will be part of a new Green-base of voters and activists.
While a regime change strategy is opposed to an all-out run against the two major parties (alla Nader2000), it does not preclude running a candidate for the presidency. There is the possibility of a “safe states” strategy. Ted Glick and Art Goodtimes have both advanced such strategies. In a safe states scenario, the Green Party would not run in “swing states” where Greens would risk handing Bush a victory, avoiding the spoiler label, while continuing to build the Party and helping maintain ballot-access for the Greens in the safe states. In Goodtimes' “Big Seven”scenario, the national party would hold-off on endorsing a candidate, deferring to the discretion of the states.
Of course, there's a third option available to the Greens: endorsing Ralph Nader. This is attractive for the obvious historical reasons, as well as Nader's celebrity status. Another positive is Nader's recent endorsement by the Reform Party, which confirms his assertions that he will be able to pull at least some votes from Bush. The downside to endorsing Nader is his insistance on running “all out” and not being tied down by any Party-imposed “geographical limits to campaigning.” Of course, the Green Party wouldn't have to put him on the ballot in swing states, and the Greens would ultimately focus on turning out the anti-Bush vote, building a future base of progressive-minded and Green voters.
If the Green Party does run a candidate, they should take a page from the the Communist Party USA's 1936 campaign and work to take two votes from the Right for every vote taken from the Left. Nader's endorsement by the Reform Party shows that stealing votes from Bush is practically as well as theoretically possible for a progressive candidate.
But the most important move for Greens is first to reject the ultra-left strategies. Candidate or no candidate, Greens should follow a strategy similar to that of the non-partisan, anti-Bush Peace and Justice Voters' movement. . The basic components of this strategy, adapted for the Green Party are:
1.Voter registration/education of new and under-represented voters
2.Development of a database of anti-Bush and potential Green voters
3.Organizing “Green Teams” to send to swing states this summer
4.Focus on fielding candidates for local, non-partisan races
5.Get Out the Vote (GOTV) Drive
6.Poll Watching on Election Day
While the Democrats and Republicans will be focused on “mobilizing their base” and going after the imaginary “center,” Greens should focus on registering under-represented constituencies like students, people of color and poor people. Registration must also be connected to education about the importance of regime change at home. Ultimately, a politics of transformation must begin by effectively organizing the disenfranchised and underrepresented.
Throughout the voter registration process, Greens should keep track of who the anti-Bush voters are and who the likely Green Party activists are. This can be done by creating a database that can be adapted for use by Green locals. This way the Greens not only turn out the anti-Bush vote on election day, but they also build a future base of Green and progressive-minded voters.
Key to regime change is bringing the most anti-Bush voters possible to the polls in this year's “battleground” states. The Green Party's national office should organize Green Teams to head to battleground states this summer for intensive voter registration.
Greens should continue to field candidates for local and, especially, non-partisan races. Greens should also look for possible openings in partisan and county- and state-level offices. Building a strong, progressive base of anti-Bush voters will also favor electing Green and progressive candidates in local races.
Leading up to election day Greens should focus on maximizing voter turnout. Every anti-Bush voter should get a phone call reminding them to get out and vote, with information regarding polling locations and assistance available to help people get to the polls.
Finally, one of the typical criticisms of the Greens usually goes something like this: “If Nader hadn't campaigned in Florida, Gore would have won the presidency.” Well, what about the thousands of, mostly black, people wrongly purged from the voting lists in Florida? To make sure that this type of racist, mass-disenfranchisement doesn't happen again Greens should volunteer as poll watchers on election day. Poll watching is especially important in battleground states. Had Gore and the Democrats stood up for the rights of the thousands of disenfranchised voters in Florida, we would have a different President today.
Conclusion: Greens and Populists, Historical Comparisons
Some have compared the dilemma faced by the Green Party in 2004 to that facing the Populists in 1896. The Populist Party was essentially a farmers' party based in the south and west. In 1890, Populists won control of the Kansas state legislature. Following this success the Populists took control of more state legislatures and elected members to Congress. In 1892, the Populist presidential candidate, James B. Weaver, won Nevada, Idaho, Colorado, and Kansas.
In 1896 the Populists ran into a crisis. The Party was internally divided between two extremes: the “midroaders” who opposed any cooperation with the Democratic party and the “fusionists” who favored working within the Democratic Party and supported the out-right endorsement of the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan. .
Ultimately, the Populists endorsed Bryan and nominated their own candidate for vice-president. Many Populists went into the Democratic Party to support Bryan. Bryan lost to McKinely and the Populists disintegrated into the Democratic Party.
Do the Greens risk making the same mistakes in 2004? The obvious problems facing a farmers' party in a rapidly industrializing society aside, the Populists' demise was not due to their failure to run a candidate for president. Rather, it was because of their failure to develop an electoral strategy that allowed them to build an independent third party, while dealing with the tactical problem of a presidential election in which they were not a contender. The Populists fell apart because of deep-divisions within the Party and the faction that deliberately fused with the Democrats.
Still, there are a few similarities. The Greens, too, are faced with the question of how to deal with a presidential election in which they are not contenders, while developing a long-term strategy for Party growth and influencing policy. The risk for the Greens in 2004, though, is not not running a candidate for president, but ignoring the strategic importance of regime change at home for the Green Party's growth, as well as the growth of society's progressive forces. Of course, just like those Populists who argued fusing with the Democrats, it would be a mistake for the Greens to endorse or support Kerry.
By pursuing a “regime change at home” strategy, Greens avoid making both mistakes. They are able to address the most immediate threat, the Bush War Party, and by focusing their attacks on Bush, instead of campaigning for Kerry, avoid creating illusions about a Kerry presidency; there's no making-believe that he represents a progressive alternative. The Greens will have increased the anti-Bush turnout in 2004, perhaps even providing the margin for Bush's defeat. In the end, the Green Party and the progressive forces will be in a better position to hold whoever wins accountable, and to build an alternative to two-party rule.
Note: A great deal of this paper is based on the analysis made by Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz in their manifesto "Moving From Protest to Politics: Defeating the Bush Regime in 2004." You can read it online at: http://www.noiraqwar-chicago.org/regimechange.rtf
by Matt Hancock
6/16/04
The most important debate at the Green Party’s upcoming Presidential Nominating Convention will not be over who to nominate or endorse as the Party’s presidential candidate, but over what kind of strategy to pursue in the 2004 elections.
Right now the main, immediate threat to peace and democracy is George Bush and his neocon cabal. They are the principle architects of the war on Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home. If not defeated, the Bush neocons will further erode civil liberties and move to control the rest of the world. For these reasons, a Bush defeat in 2004 is a strategic objective for Greens.
The challenge for Greens is figuring out an approach to the 2004 elections that allows them to contribute to Bush's defeat, while continuing to build an independent party capable of challenging both the Democrats and the Republicans. Doing both is not as impossible as it seems. This paper aims to outline a strategy that will allow the Green Party to contribute to Bush's defeat, while sticking to its principles, continuing to grow, and build a long-term challenge to the two-party duopoly.
Between Two Dead-Ends
It often seems that the Green Party is stuck between two dead-end strategies: on one the hand you have the ultra-left oppositionists; and on the other are those Green Party critics who argue for a “lesser-of-two-evils” vote.
The ultra-left, opposition to “the establishment parties” in general strategy is perhaps best articulated by Peter Camejo's “The Avocado Declaration” and Ben Manski's, “Green and Growing: 2004 in Perspective.” Camejo does a good job of describing the historical development of the two party system and the important role the Democrats play in protecting the ruling class from popular movements. But he takes an often times ridiculously ultra-left position, even berating one of the Greens' strongest strategic allies within the Democratic Party, Dennis Kucinich. And while Camejo is correct that both Democrats and Republicans represent ruling class interests, he fails to grasp the important differences among members of the ruling class, and the historically specific factors the Left is faced with in 2004 (not to mention the Left's, and the Green party's, own weakness and marginality). Besides a good critique of the US political system, Camejo does not offer a viable strategy for the Green Party.
Manski, on the other hand, sees the 2004 presidential race as a “vital,” all-important test of the Green Party's ability to move from “alternative” to “opposition” party. Having established themselves as the “nation's opposition party” it would be a failure of “duty” if the Greens didn't “hold our own” in the 2004 presidential elections. One of the big problems with the paper is Manski's inflated view of the Green Party's strengths (not to mention the fact that most Americans don't see the Greens as the nation's opposition party). But most significantly, “Green and Growing” treats the presidential election (a once-every-four-years, publicity-driven horse race) as an all important party-building strategy, ignoring the overwhelming importance of local, non-partisan elections (as well as the importance of high-profile, local races like Matt Gonzalez's bid for Mayor in San Francisco, in which Bill Clinton had to intervene to guarantee a Democratic victory). What “Green and Growing” offers, opposition to the establishment on all fronts, simply isn't a strategy for building a party.
Looking at the importance that “Green and Growing” places on running a presidential candidate, one would expect to see significantly lower levels of Green Party growth in between presidential elections. This just isn't true. In the three years after Nader's run (2001-2003) the Greens elected a total of 204 candidates; that's an average of 68 per year. In 2000, with Nader's high-profile campaign, only 48 Greens won office. (In the four years before Nader2000, the total number of Greens elected was only 80). The great majority of these wins have been in local, non-partisan races. This is where most of the growth in the future will be.
This is not to say that Nader wasn't important for the Green Party. But more important was the move to create the national party (already underway when Nader made his run), to open up an office in DC, and the critical work done on the ground since the 2000 elections. Of course, none of this would have been possibile—including Nader2000—if the Greens hadn't laid the groundwork during the previous 15 years.
In short, the Green Party's success is not dependent on high-profile electoral politics, and will not, simply by not running someone in 2004, wither away.
So where does this leave us? Is 2004 simply “not the right time” for a third party challenge to the duopoly? Do Greens need to follow a lesser-of-two-evils strategy and support a mediocre candidate like Kerry who doesn't represent a fraction of the Greens' values and platform?
The short answer is no. The lesser-of-two-evils argument is short-sighted, intellectually weak and just plain depressing. This is a political dead-end. Not only does it guarantee that we keep getting evil, but it falls into the same trap as the ultra-left strategies: it offers no viable strategy for a transformational politics.
The Green Party must develop a new strategy that rejects both extremes, capable of dealing with the immediate problem of the Bush War Party and the long-term one of building a third party. But before getting into what such a strategy would look like, let's take a look at the political terrain progressives are faced with in 2004.
Is There Really a Difference Between Kerry and Bush?
Greens argue, correctly, that the two parties are both captives of “corporate interests” (read: the ruling class). But just as there are differences within the ruling class, there are also differences between the two parties. For this reason, Greens cannot afford to be indifferent to the outcome of the 2004 elections.
Bush is guided by the Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney-Perle “War Party.” The Bush War Party represents the most reactionary section of the ruling class—the Hegemonists—whose goal is nothing short of total American hegemony over the rest of the world. This is the group that opportunistically seized on September 11th to launch the war in Iraq and has been leading the assault on civil liberties at home. The Bush War Party is the main, immediate danger to peace abroad and democracy at home.
Bush has already out-fundraised Kerry nearly 2:1, leaving him with a more than $200 million war chest, against Kerry's $110 million. The nature of the highly media-driven US elections, the structural barriers to third party challenges and the overall weakness of the progressive forces means that beating Bush is going to require significant financial muscle. Right now only the ruling class has the material resources needed to beat Bush. This is why the upcoming presidential election cannot be seen as a struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism, but between two factions of the ruling class.
This is where the other main faction—the Globalists—comes in. The more multi-lateral oriented Globalists, typified by investors like George Soros, are dismayed by the Bush War Party. This is the faction that supports John Kerry's candidacy and that has the financial resources to beat Bush. (Soros, for example, has pledged a minimum of $12.5 million to beat Bush. ) Again, in 2004 the choice is not between Bush and an anti-imperialist, but between Hegemonists and Globalists.
Regime Change Begins at Home!
As Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz put it, in “Moving From Protest to Politics: Dumping Bush's Regime in 2004,” a Bush re-election will, “not only deepen the misery of those who suffer in this nation, but narrow the opportunity for dissent as well.” On the other hand, they point out, not only will the Bush War Party's Globalist rivals benefit from its defeat, all the progressive forces will benefit as well.
But beating Bush does not mean endorsing Kerry or supporting the Democrats (why endorse a candidate that doesn't even represent a fraction of your values?). What it does require is a shift in strategic thinking for the Green Party. Ralph Nader is right, DC is “corporate occupied territory” and we need to shift power to the American people; the Green Party is right, we need to break the grip of the two-party duopoly and build an effective third party. But running a presidential candidate is not the only (or even most effective) strategy for doing so.
First, we've seen that the growth of the Green Party is not dependent on a high-profile, national campaign, challenging the establishment parties on any and all fronts. Second it is in the overwhelming interests of the majority of people in the world, not to mention the development of the progressive forces (and the Green Party), to remove Bush from office. This is why dumping Bush is a strategic goal for the Green Party. This means that the Greens must make “Regime Change at Home” their battle-cry for the 2004 elections.
Green Strategy in 2004
A campaign for regime change means focusing the Green Party's main attacks against Bush, while working to bring a progressive bloc of anti-Bush voters to the polls. These voters will understand that Bush is the main threat to peace and democracy, but will not have any illusions about Kerry. They will be part of a growing independent progressive movement that will hold whoever wins accountable. Some of those anti-Bush voters will be part of a new Green-base of voters and activists.
While a regime change strategy is opposed to an all-out run against the two major parties (alla Nader2000), it does not preclude running a candidate for the presidency. There is the possibility of a “safe states” strategy. Ted Glick and Art Goodtimes have both advanced such strategies. In a safe states scenario, the Green Party would not run in “swing states” where Greens would risk handing Bush a victory, avoiding the spoiler label, while continuing to build the Party and helping maintain ballot-access for the Greens in the safe states. In Goodtimes' “Big Seven”scenario, the national party would hold-off on endorsing a candidate, deferring to the discretion of the states.
Of course, there's a third option available to the Greens: endorsing Ralph Nader. This is attractive for the obvious historical reasons, as well as Nader's celebrity status. Another positive is Nader's recent endorsement by the Reform Party, which confirms his assertions that he will be able to pull at least some votes from Bush. The downside to endorsing Nader is his insistance on running “all out” and not being tied down by any Party-imposed “geographical limits to campaigning.” Of course, the Green Party wouldn't have to put him on the ballot in swing states, and the Greens would ultimately focus on turning out the anti-Bush vote, building a future base of progressive-minded and Green voters.
If the Green Party does run a candidate, they should take a page from the the Communist Party USA's 1936 campaign and work to take two votes from the Right for every vote taken from the Left. Nader's endorsement by the Reform Party shows that stealing votes from Bush is practically as well as theoretically possible for a progressive candidate.
But the most important move for Greens is first to reject the ultra-left strategies. Candidate or no candidate, Greens should follow a strategy similar to that of the non-partisan, anti-Bush Peace and Justice Voters' movement. . The basic components of this strategy, adapted for the Green Party are:
1.Voter registration/education of new and under-represented voters
2.Development of a database of anti-Bush and potential Green voters
3.Organizing “Green Teams” to send to swing states this summer
4.Focus on fielding candidates for local, non-partisan races
5.Get Out the Vote (GOTV) Drive
6.Poll Watching on Election Day
While the Democrats and Republicans will be focused on “mobilizing their base” and going after the imaginary “center,” Greens should focus on registering under-represented constituencies like students, people of color and poor people. Registration must also be connected to education about the importance of regime change at home. Ultimately, a politics of transformation must begin by effectively organizing the disenfranchised and underrepresented.
Throughout the voter registration process, Greens should keep track of who the anti-Bush voters are and who the likely Green Party activists are. This can be done by creating a database that can be adapted for use by Green locals. This way the Greens not only turn out the anti-Bush vote on election day, but they also build a future base of Green and progressive-minded voters.
Key to regime change is bringing the most anti-Bush voters possible to the polls in this year's “battleground” states. The Green Party's national office should organize Green Teams to head to battleground states this summer for intensive voter registration.
Greens should continue to field candidates for local and, especially, non-partisan races. Greens should also look for possible openings in partisan and county- and state-level offices. Building a strong, progressive base of anti-Bush voters will also favor electing Green and progressive candidates in local races.
Leading up to election day Greens should focus on maximizing voter turnout. Every anti-Bush voter should get a phone call reminding them to get out and vote, with information regarding polling locations and assistance available to help people get to the polls.
Finally, one of the typical criticisms of the Greens usually goes something like this: “If Nader hadn't campaigned in Florida, Gore would have won the presidency.” Well, what about the thousands of, mostly black, people wrongly purged from the voting lists in Florida? To make sure that this type of racist, mass-disenfranchisement doesn't happen again Greens should volunteer as poll watchers on election day. Poll watching is especially important in battleground states. Had Gore and the Democrats stood up for the rights of the thousands of disenfranchised voters in Florida, we would have a different President today.
Conclusion: Greens and Populists, Historical Comparisons
Some have compared the dilemma faced by the Green Party in 2004 to that facing the Populists in 1896. The Populist Party was essentially a farmers' party based in the south and west. In 1890, Populists won control of the Kansas state legislature. Following this success the Populists took control of more state legislatures and elected members to Congress. In 1892, the Populist presidential candidate, James B. Weaver, won Nevada, Idaho, Colorado, and Kansas.
In 1896 the Populists ran into a crisis. The Party was internally divided between two extremes: the “midroaders” who opposed any cooperation with the Democratic party and the “fusionists” who favored working within the Democratic Party and supported the out-right endorsement of the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan. .
Ultimately, the Populists endorsed Bryan and nominated their own candidate for vice-president. Many Populists went into the Democratic Party to support Bryan. Bryan lost to McKinely and the Populists disintegrated into the Democratic Party.
Do the Greens risk making the same mistakes in 2004? The obvious problems facing a farmers' party in a rapidly industrializing society aside, the Populists' demise was not due to their failure to run a candidate for president. Rather, it was because of their failure to develop an electoral strategy that allowed them to build an independent third party, while dealing with the tactical problem of a presidential election in which they were not a contender. The Populists fell apart because of deep-divisions within the Party and the faction that deliberately fused with the Democrats.
Still, there are a few similarities. The Greens, too, are faced with the question of how to deal with a presidential election in which they are not contenders, while developing a long-term strategy for Party growth and influencing policy. The risk for the Greens in 2004, though, is not not running a candidate for president, but ignoring the strategic importance of regime change at home for the Green Party's growth, as well as the growth of society's progressive forces. Of course, just like those Populists who argued fusing with the Democrats, it would be a mistake for the Greens to endorse or support Kerry.
By pursuing a “regime change at home” strategy, Greens avoid making both mistakes. They are able to address the most immediate threat, the Bush War Party, and by focusing their attacks on Bush, instead of campaigning for Kerry, avoid creating illusions about a Kerry presidency; there's no making-believe that he represents a progressive alternative. The Greens will have increased the anti-Bush turnout in 2004, perhaps even providing the margin for Bush's defeat. In the end, the Green Party and the progressive forces will be in a better position to hold whoever wins accountable, and to build an alternative to two-party rule.
Note: A great deal of this paper is based on the analysis made by Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz in their manifesto "Moving From Protest to Politics: Defeating the Bush Regime in 2004." You can read it online at: http://www.noiraqwar-chicago.org/regimechange.rtf
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