The Green Party & the 2004 Elections: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?

The Green Party & the 2004 Elections: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
by Matt Hancock
6/16/04

The most important debate at the Green Party’s upcoming Presidential Nominating Convention will not be over who to nominate or endorse as the Party’s presidential candidate, but over what kind of strategy to pursue in the 2004 elections.

Right now the main, immediate threat to peace and democracy is George Bush and his neocon cabal. They are the principle architects of the war on Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home. If not defeated, the Bush neocons will further erode civil liberties and move to control the rest of the world. For these reasons, a Bush defeat in 2004 is a strategic objective for Greens.

The challenge for Greens is figuring out an approach to the 2004 elections that allows them to contribute to Bush's defeat, while continuing to build an independent party capable of challenging both the Democrats and the Republicans. Doing both is not as impossible as it seems. This paper aims to outline a strategy that will allow the Green Party to contribute to Bush's defeat, while sticking to its principles, continuing to grow, and build a long-term challenge to the two-party duopoly.

Between Two Dead-Ends

It often seems that the Green Party is stuck between two dead-end strategies: on one the hand you have the ultra-left oppositionists; and on the other are those Green Party critics who argue for a “lesser-of-two-evils” vote.

The ultra-left, opposition to “the establishment parties” in general strategy is perhaps best articulated by Peter Camejo's “The Avocado Declaration” and Ben Manski's, “Green and Growing: 2004 in Perspective.” Camejo does a good job of describing the historical development of the two party system and the important role the Democrats play in protecting the ruling class from popular movements. But he takes an often times ridiculously ultra-left position, even berating one of the Greens' strongest strategic allies within the Democratic Party, Dennis Kucinich. And while Camejo is correct that both Democrats and Republicans represent ruling class interests, he fails to grasp the important differences among members of the ruling class, and the historically specific factors the Left is faced with in 2004 (not to mention the Left's, and the Green party's, own weakness and marginality). Besides a good critique of the US political system, Camejo does not offer a viable strategy for the Green Party.

Manski, on the other hand, sees the 2004 presidential race as a “vital,” all-important test of the Green Party's ability to move from “alternative” to “opposition” party. Having established themselves as the “nation's opposition party” it would be a failure of “duty” if the Greens didn't “hold our own” in the 2004 presidential elections. One of the big problems with the paper is Manski's inflated view of the Green Party's strengths (not to mention the fact that most Americans don't see the Greens as the nation's opposition party). But most significantly, “Green and Growing” treats the presidential election (a once-every-four-years, publicity-driven horse race) as an all important party-building strategy, ignoring the overwhelming importance of local, non-partisan elections (as well as the importance of high-profile, local races like Matt Gonzalez's bid for Mayor in San Francisco, in which Bill Clinton had to intervene to guarantee a Democratic victory). What “Green and Growing” offers, opposition to the establishment on all fronts, simply isn't a strategy for building a party.

Looking at the importance that “Green and Growing” places on running a presidential candidate, one would expect to see significantly lower levels of Green Party growth in between presidential elections. This just isn't true. In the three years after Nader's run (2001-2003) the Greens elected a total of 204 candidates; that's an average of 68 per year. In 2000, with Nader's high-profile campaign, only 48 Greens won office. (In the four years before Nader2000, the total number of Greens elected was only 80). The great majority of these wins have been in local, non-partisan races. This is where most of the growth in the future will be.

This is not to say that Nader wasn't important for the Green Party. But more important was the move to create the national party (already underway when Nader made his run), to open up an office in DC, and the critical work done on the ground since the 2000 elections. Of course, none of this would have been possibile—including Nader2000—if the Greens hadn't laid the groundwork during the previous 15 years.

In short, the Green Party's success is not dependent on high-profile electoral politics, and will not, simply by not running someone in 2004, wither away.

So where does this leave us? Is 2004 simply “not the right time” for a third party challenge to the duopoly? Do Greens need to follow a lesser-of-two-evils strategy and support a mediocre candidate like Kerry who doesn't represent a fraction of the Greens' values and platform?

The short answer is no. The lesser-of-two-evils argument is short-sighted, intellectually weak and just plain depressing. This is a political dead-end. Not only does it guarantee that we keep getting evil, but it falls into the same trap as the ultra-left strategies: it offers no viable strategy for a transformational politics.

The Green Party must develop a new strategy that rejects both extremes, capable of dealing with the immediate problem of the Bush War Party and the long-term one of building a third party. But before getting into what such a strategy would look like, let's take a look at the political terrain progressives are faced with in 2004.

Is There Really a Difference Between Kerry and Bush?

Greens argue, correctly, that the two parties are both captives of “corporate interests” (read: the ruling class). But just as there are differences within the ruling class, there are also differences between the two parties. For this reason, Greens cannot afford to be indifferent to the outcome of the 2004 elections.

Bush is guided by the Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney-Perle “War Party.” The Bush War Party represents the most reactionary section of the ruling class—the Hegemonists—whose goal is nothing short of total American hegemony over the rest of the world. This is the group that opportunistically seized on September 11th to launch the war in Iraq and has been leading the assault on civil liberties at home. The Bush War Party is the main, immediate danger to peace abroad and democracy at home.

Bush has already out-fundraised Kerry nearly 2:1, leaving him with a more than $200 million war chest, against Kerry's $110 million. The nature of the highly media-driven US elections, the structural barriers to third party challenges and the overall weakness of the progressive forces means that beating Bush is going to require significant financial muscle. Right now only the ruling class has the material resources needed to beat Bush. This is why the upcoming presidential election cannot be seen as a struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism, but between two factions of the ruling class.

This is where the other main faction—the Globalists—comes in. The more multi-lateral oriented Globalists, typified by investors like George Soros, are dismayed by the Bush War Party. This is the faction that supports John Kerry's candidacy and that has the financial resources to beat Bush. (Soros, for example, has pledged a minimum of $12.5 million to beat Bush. ) Again, in 2004 the choice is not between Bush and an anti-imperialist, but between Hegemonists and Globalists.

Regime Change Begins at Home!

As Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz put it, in “Moving From Protest to Politics: Dumping Bush's Regime in 2004,” a Bush re-election will, “not only deepen the misery of those who suffer in this nation, but narrow the opportunity for dissent as well.” On the other hand, they point out, not only will the Bush War Party's Globalist rivals benefit from its defeat, all the progressive forces will benefit as well.

But beating Bush does not mean endorsing Kerry or supporting the Democrats (why endorse a candidate that doesn't even represent a fraction of your values?). What it does require is a shift in strategic thinking for the Green Party. Ralph Nader is right, DC is “corporate occupied territory” and we need to shift power to the American people; the Green Party is right, we need to break the grip of the two-party duopoly and build an effective third party. But running a presidential candidate is not the only (or even most effective) strategy for doing so.

First, we've seen that the growth of the Green Party is not dependent on a high-profile, national campaign, challenging the establishment parties on any and all fronts. Second it is in the overwhelming interests of the majority of people in the world, not to mention the development of the progressive forces (and the Green Party), to remove Bush from office. This is why dumping Bush is a strategic goal for the Green Party. This means that the Greens must make “Regime Change at Home” their battle-cry for the 2004 elections.

Green Strategy in 2004

A campaign for regime change means focusing the Green Party's main attacks against Bush, while working to bring a progressive bloc of anti-Bush voters to the polls. These voters will understand that Bush is the main threat to peace and democracy, but will not have any illusions about Kerry. They will be part of a growing independent progressive movement that will hold whoever wins accountable. Some of those anti-Bush voters will be part of a new Green-base of voters and activists.

While a regime change strategy is opposed to an all-out run against the two major parties (alla Nader2000), it does not preclude running a candidate for the presidency. There is the possibility of a “safe states” strategy. Ted Glick and Art Goodtimes have both advanced such strategies. In a safe states scenario, the Green Party would not run in “swing states” where Greens would risk handing Bush a victory, avoiding the spoiler label, while continuing to build the Party and helping maintain ballot-access for the Greens in the safe states. In Goodtimes' “Big Seven”scenario, the national party would hold-off on endorsing a candidate, deferring to the discretion of the states.

Of course, there's a third option available to the Greens: endorsing Ralph Nader. This is attractive for the obvious historical reasons, as well as Nader's celebrity status. Another positive is Nader's recent endorsement by the Reform Party, which confirms his assertions that he will be able to pull at least some votes from Bush. The downside to endorsing Nader is his insistance on running “all out” and not being tied down by any Party-imposed “geographical limits to campaigning.” Of course, the Green Party wouldn't have to put him on the ballot in swing states, and the Greens would ultimately focus on turning out the anti-Bush vote, building a future base of progressive-minded and Green voters.

If the Green Party does run a candidate, they should take a page from the the Communist Party USA's 1936 campaign and work to take two votes from the Right for every vote taken from the Left. Nader's endorsement by the Reform Party shows that stealing votes from Bush is practically as well as theoretically possible for a progressive candidate.

But the most important move for Greens is first to reject the ultra-left strategies. Candidate or no candidate, Greens should follow a strategy similar to that of the non-partisan, anti-Bush Peace and Justice Voters' movement. . The basic components of this strategy, adapted for the Green Party are:

1.Voter registration/education of new and under-represented voters
2.Development of a database of anti-Bush and potential Green voters
3.Organizing “Green Teams” to send to swing states this summer
4.Focus on fielding candidates for local, non-partisan races
5.Get Out the Vote (GOTV) Drive
6.Poll Watching on Election Day

While the Democrats and Republicans will be focused on “mobilizing their base” and going after the imaginary “center,” Greens should focus on registering under-represented constituencies like students, people of color and poor people. Registration must also be connected to education about the importance of regime change at home. Ultimately, a politics of transformation must begin by effectively organizing the disenfranchised and underrepresented.

Throughout the voter registration process, Greens should keep track of who the anti-Bush voters are and who the likely Green Party activists are. This can be done by creating a database that can be adapted for use by Green locals. This way the Greens not only turn out the anti-Bush vote on election day, but they also build a future base of Green and progressive-minded voters.

Key to regime change is bringing the most anti-Bush voters possible to the polls in this year's “battleground” states. The Green Party's national office should organize Green Teams to head to battleground states this summer for intensive voter registration.

Greens should continue to field candidates for local and, especially, non-partisan races. Greens should also look for possible openings in partisan and county- and state-level offices. Building a strong, progressive base of anti-Bush voters will also favor electing Green and progressive candidates in local races.

Leading up to election day Greens should focus on maximizing voter turnout. Every anti-Bush voter should get a phone call reminding them to get out and vote, with information regarding polling locations and assistance available to help people get to the polls.

Finally, one of the typical criticisms of the Greens usually goes something like this: “If Nader hadn't campaigned in Florida, Gore would have won the presidency.” Well, what about the thousands of, mostly black, people wrongly purged from the voting lists in Florida? To make sure that this type of racist, mass-disenfranchisement doesn't happen again Greens should volunteer as poll watchers on election day. Poll watching is especially important in battleground states. Had Gore and the Democrats stood up for the rights of the thousands of disenfranchised voters in Florida, we would have a different President today.

Conclusion: Greens and Populists, Historical Comparisons

Some have compared the dilemma faced by the Green Party in 2004 to that facing the Populists in 1896. The Populist Party was essentially a farmers' party based in the south and west. In 1890, Populists won control of the Kansas state legislature. Following this success the Populists took control of more state legislatures and elected members to Congress. In 1892, the Populist presidential candidate, James B. Weaver, won Nevada, Idaho, Colorado, and Kansas.

In 1896 the Populists ran into a crisis. The Party was internally divided between two extremes: the “midroaders” who opposed any cooperation with the Democratic party and the “fusionists” who favored working within the Democratic Party and supported the out-right endorsement of the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan. .

Ultimately, the Populists endorsed Bryan and nominated their own candidate for vice-president. Many Populists went into the Democratic Party to support Bryan. Bryan lost to McKinely and the Populists disintegrated into the Democratic Party.

Do the Greens risk making the same mistakes in 2004? The obvious problems facing a farmers' party in a rapidly industrializing society aside, the Populists' demise was not due to their failure to run a candidate for president. Rather, it was because of their failure to develop an electoral strategy that allowed them to build an independent third party, while dealing with the tactical problem of a presidential election in which they were not a contender. The Populists fell apart because of deep-divisions within the Party and the faction that deliberately fused with the Democrats.

Still, there are a few similarities. The Greens, too, are faced with the question of how to deal with a presidential election in which they are not contenders, while developing a long-term strategy for Party growth and influencing policy. The risk for the Greens in 2004, though, is not not running a candidate for president, but ignoring the strategic importance of regime change at home for the Green Party's growth, as well as the growth of society's progressive forces. Of course, just like those Populists who argued fusing with the Democrats, it would be a mistake for the Greens to endorse or support Kerry.

By pursuing a “regime change at home” strategy, Greens avoid making both mistakes. They are able to address the most immediate threat, the Bush War Party, and by focusing their attacks on Bush, instead of campaigning for Kerry, avoid creating illusions about a Kerry presidency; there's no making-believe that he represents a progressive alternative. The Greens will have increased the anti-Bush turnout in 2004, perhaps even providing the margin for Bush's defeat. In the end, the Green Party and the progressive forces will be in a better position to hold whoever wins accountable, and to build an alternative to two-party rule.

Note: A great deal of this paper is based on the analysis made by Carl Davidson and Marilyn Katz in their manifesto "Moving From Protest to Politics: Defeating the Bush Regime in 2004." You can read it online at: http://www.noiraqwar-chicago.org/regimechange.rtf